Manual assessment of your AWS, Azure, or GCP environment focused on the misconfigurations, privilege paths, and identity-based attack chains a real threat actor would exploit.
In cloud environments, identity is the new perimeter. CSPM tools list misconfigurations but cannot tell you which ones chain together into a path that lets an attacker reach your crown jewels. That requires human analysis.
Traditional network penetration testing assumes a network perimeter. In cloud environments, that perimeter has dissolved. The relevant attack surface is identity, configuration, and trust relationships, both within your cloud account and across the services your account integrates with. A real cloud attacker does not exploit a buffer overflow. They find an over-privileged service principal, an exposed S3 bucket, a developer machine with cached credentials, or a CI/CD pipeline with too much access, and they pivot.
Our cloud assessments are configuration reviews combined with attack-path analysis. We use the same tooling and techniques real threat actors and advanced red teams use: PMapper, AzureHound, ROADtools, ScoutSuite, Prowler, and a lot of manual investigation. The output is not a list of every misconfiguration the cloud provider's tools have already flagged. It is the chain of misconfigurations that, combined, produce real impact.
AWS IAM, Azure RBAC and Entra ID, and GCP IAM policies. We map the identities (users, service accounts, roles, service principals) and the actions they can perform, then trace the privilege escalation paths an attacker could walk from any compromised identity to administrative access.
Public S3 buckets, exposed databases, misconfigured network security groups, overly permissive resource policies, and resource sharing across boundaries that should be isolated. We focus on the misconfigurations a CSPM tool would flag and the ones it would not.
Secrets in infrastructure-as-code repositories, container images, function code, instance metadata, environment variables, build logs, and customer-uploaded content. We grep where attackers grep and check what your CI pipeline leaks.
Trust relationships that work as designed during day-to-day operations but expose paths into your environment when one side is compromised. AssumeRole chains, federated identity trust, and cross-account access policies that were appropriate when written and dangerous after team changes.
Pod security policies and standards, container image vulnerabilities relevant to your runtime, RBAC misconfigurations, network policies, secrets management, and the privilege boundaries between workloads in the same cluster. Pod escape paths, service account abuse, and container-to-host pivots.
Your build and deploy pipelines have access to your cloud environment. We test what an attacker who compromises a developer's git account, a CI runner, or a third-party action could do with the access your pipeline has.
The single sign-on, federation, and identity provider integrations that grant access to your cloud. SAML misconfigurations, OAuth scope issues, and identity provider trust failures are common roots of cloud compromise.
Active assessment typically runs one to three weeks depending on environment size and complexity. Most engagements are conducted from a read-only IAM role you provide us, scoped to the in-scope accounts. We do not modify your environment. The engagement follows our standard five-phase methodology.
For configuration-focused assessments, no. AWS, Azure, and GCP allow customer security testing of their own resources without prior notification, subject to provider policies. For active-exploitation testing against your cloud resources, we follow the relevant provider's policy and notify when required.
No. We use read-only access for assessment and configuration review. Any active testing that would modify resources is discussed and authorized in advance, and confined to designated test resources.
Yes, when scoped together. Multi-cloud environments often have cross-cloud trust relationships that need testing in combination, not in isolation.
CSPM tools (Wiz, Lacework, Prisma, AWS Security Hub) report misconfigurations. They are valuable for continuous monitoring. They cannot, on their own, tell you which misconfigurations chain together into actual exploit paths, or which findings are theoretically risky versus actually exploitable in your specific environment. That requires human analysis. Our work complements CSPM, not replaces it.
We scope to the highest-impact resources first: production accounts, identity-providers, the highest-privilege roles, and the systems your business depends on most. A full environment-wide review is possible but typically not the most efficient use of the engagement.
Tell us which clouds, which accounts, and what compliance drivers apply. We will respond within one business day.